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Abstract—In this paper, a novel anti-jamming mechanism is
proposed to analyze and enhance the security of adversarial
Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) systems. In particular,
the problem is formulated as a dynamic psychological game
between a soldier and an attacker. In this game, the soldier
seeks to accomplish a time-critical mission by traversing a
battlefield within a certain amount of time, while maintaining its
connectivity with an IoBT network. The attacker, on the other
hand, seeks to find the optimal opportunity to compromise the
IoBT network and maximize the delay of the soldier’s IoBT
transmission link. The soldier and the attacker’s psychological
behavior are captured using tools from psychological game
theory, with which the soldier’s and attacker’s intentions to harm
one another are considered in their utilities. To solve this game, a
novel learning algorithm based on Bayesian updating is proposed
to find a ǫ-like psychological self-confirming equilibrium of the
game. Simulation results show that, based on the error-free beliefs
on the attacker’s psychological strategies and beliefs, the soldier’s
material payoff can be improved by up to 15.11% compared to a
conventional dynamic game without psychological considerations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging Internet of Things (IoT) technologies have led to
significant changes in how autonomous systems are managed
[1]. In a military environment, IoT technologies provide new
ways for managing and operating a battlefield by intercon-
necting combat equipment, soldier devices, and other battle-
field resources [2]. This integration of the IoT with military
networks is referred to as the Internet of Battlefield Things
(IoBT) [1]. In an IoBT, the connectivity between the wearables
carried by the soldiers and other IoBT devices, such as
multipurpose sensors, autonomous vehicles, and drones, plays
a significant role in the mission-critical battlefield operations
[3]. However, the connectivity between these devices is highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks, given the the adversarial nature
of the battlefield coupled with the limitations of the IoBT
devices’ security mechanisms [4]. Moreover, in an adversarial
battlefield environment, the psychology of the soldiers and
attackers could significantly influence their behavior, and,
subsequently influence the security of the IoBT network.
A. Related Works
The existing literature has studied a number of problems
related to the security of the IoBT [2]–[5]. In [2], the commu-
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nications and information management challenges of the IoBT
are investigated. The work in [3] integrates IoT and network
centric warfare for the enhancement of the IoBT integrity.
The authors in [4] use a feedback Stackelberg solution to
dynamically optimize the connectivity of an adversarial IoBT
network. The work in [5] develops a mean-field game approach
to analyze the spread of misinformation in an adversarial
IoBT. Despite the promising results, these existing works [2]–
[4] mostly rely on static constructs and do not consider the
influence of the human players’ psychology and potential
bounded rationality when making decisions or choosing strate-
gies within an IoBT setting. Indeed, the behavioral aspect of
human decision making processes, leading agents to deviate
from the fully rational objective behavior in an IoBT, has a
direct impact on the security of the IoBT network. Hence, this
aspect must be accounted for and thoroughly studied within
the context of studying and assessing the security of the IoBT.
Recently, there has been significant interest in studying
human behavior and its cyber-psychical security impact. The
authors in [6] study a common-pool resource game that
captures the players’ risk preference using tools from prospect
theory. The work in [7] uses prospect theory to study the
effect of a defender’s and attacker’s subjective behavior on
the security of a drone delivery system. The work in [8]
uses prospect theory to analyze the interaction between the
defender of a cloud storage system and an attacker targeting
the system with advanced persistent threats. In [9], a cogni-
tive hierarchy theory based approach is proposed to capture
the bounded rationality of defenders and attackers in cyber-
physical systems. These previous works present interesting
and novel results. However, the existing literature has not yet
considered and analyzed the influence of players’ psychology
on the game-theoretic decision making in IoT networks. In
fact, recent works in the game theory literature have shown that
decision making is strongly impacted by human psychology
and have studied various games’ aspects and solutions while
accounting for psychological factors [10]–[13]. In this regard,
the work in [10] proves the existence of sub-game perfect
and sequential equilibria in psychological games. The authors
in [11] study a game-theoretic model that captures dynamic
psychological effects and develops new psychological game
solution concepts. The work in [12] considers the behavioral
consequences of psychology in presence of blaming behaviors.
In addition, the effect of the human psychology in mean-field-
type games is studied in [13]. Despite the promising results,
these existing works on psychological game theory and its
applications [10]–[13] have not analyzed the potential adoption
of psychological game approaches in security scenarios. In
[14], we studied how a soldier’s and an attacker’s psychology
can impact an IoBT network’s security. However, in [14], the
players’ resource limitations and IoBT connectivity objectives
are not considered. In addition, in [14], the soldier’s actions at
each step in the battlefield reveal the soldier’s preference on
its future actions, as such the psychological forward induction
of [14] can be used to solve the proposed security problem.
Yet, in a real battlefield, the soldier’ actions can be rather
independent at each time step, making the psychological
forward induction based solution of [14] infeasible. Thus, there
is a need to introduce new solutions that dynamically predict
and react to the actions of adversaries in the battlefield, while
taking the players’ resource limitation and IoBT connectivity
objectives into consideration.
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the psycho-
logical behavior of human decision makers in an adversarial
IoBT network, in presence of stringent resource limitations
(i.e. time limitation and power limitation) for the players. To
our best knowledge, this is the first work that jointly considers
players’ resource limitation and their psychological behavior
for securing an IoBT network. Our key contributions include:
• We develop a novel framework to dynamically optimize
the connectivity between a soldier and the IoBT network.
We consider a battlefield in which a soldier must accom-
plish a time-critical mission that requires traversing the
battlefield while maintaining connectivity with the IoBT
network. Meanwhile, the attacker in the battlefield is in-
terested in compromising the soldier’s IoBT connectivity,
by selectively jamming the IoBT network at each time
instant in the battlefield. The solider, acting as a defender,
will selectively connect to certain IoBT devices at each
time instant along its mission path, so as to evade the
attack.
• We formulate this IoBT security problem as a dynamic
game, in which the soldier attempts to predict and evade
the attacker’s attack at each time instant in the battlefield
to minimize its cumulative expected retransmission delay,
while the attacker aims at optimally targeting the IoBT
devices to maximize the soldier’s retransmission delay
while accounting for its limited cumulative jamming
power. Both the soldier’s time limitation and the at-
tacker’s power limitation are considered in the formulated
game. In this regard, we prove the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium (NE) of this game, under a set of defined
conditions, and we study the resulting NE strategies,
which allows analysis of the optimal decision making
processes of the soldier and attacker based on their
built set of beliefs over the strategy on their opponent’s
strategies.
• We perform fundamental analysis on the soldier’s and at-
tacker’s psychology in the battlefield using the framework
of psychological game theory [11]. In the formulated
psychological game, the psychology of the players (i.e.
the soldier and the attacker) is modeled as their intention
to frustrate each other. The frustration of the players is
quantified as the gap, if positive, between their expected
payoff and actual payoff. A psychological equilibrium
(PE) is used to solve the psychological IoBT game. In
this regard, we prove the uniqueness of the PE for our
proposed psychological game, under the same set of
conditions at which the NE is unique. In addition, our
analytical results show that, in an attempt to frustrate the
soldier, at the PE, the attacker is more prone to attack the
IoBT device with the best channel conditions.
• We propose a Bayesian updating algorithm to establish
the players’ belief system, so as to solve the proposed
psychological IoBT game. In this regard, the algorithm
characterizes what is known as an ǫ-like psychological
self-confirming equilibrium (PSCE) of our proposed psy-
chological game.
• The results also show that, based on its error-free beliefs
on the attacker’s psychological strategies and beliefs,
the soldier can obtain an up to 15.11% gains in its
expected material payoff at equilibrium, compared to a
conventional dynamic game. Meanwhile, using Bayesian
updating, the soldier and the attacker can achieve ǫ-like
beliefs, such that an ǫ-like self-confirming psychological
equilibrium of the formulated psychological game can be
reached. Simulation results also show that, the non-error-
free beliefs, which result from, for example, 10 iterations
in the Bayesian updating algorithm, can yield up to 9.23%
loss in terms of the soldier’s expected material payoff.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model and problem formulation are described in Section II.
The psychological analysis of the soldier and attacker is rep-
resented in Section III. The Bayesian updating-based solution
of the psychological IoBT game is proposed in Section IV.
In Section V, simulation results are presented and analyzed.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a battlefield in which a soldier seeks to move from
an origin O to a destination D along a predefined path, using
a minimum amount of time as shown in Fig. 1. At the same
time, this soldier tries to communicate with a total of X IoBT
devices in a set X that is uniformly deployed along this path,
to get access to situational awareness within the battlefield
and to receive instructions from the battlefield commander.
The soldier can only associate with one IoBT device at each
location. The soldier should communicate with J < X IoBT
devices along the path, so as to maintain its total downlink
transmission delay lower than ∆, while getting access to the
required information on time. Meanwhile, in this battlefield, an
attacker seeks to disrupt the connectivity between the soldier
and the IoBT devices by jamming the communication links.
Given the limitation on its total power E, the attacker can only
compromise (i.e. jam) the IoBT network at most J ′ times
along the path. At each step in this battlefield, the soldier
and attacker will sequentially choose strategies to realize their
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Fig. 1. Soldier battlefield security graph.
objective, based on their perfect observation on what happened
in the battlefield. Here, the soldier’s objective is minimizing its
communication delay, the attacker’s objective is maximizing
the soldier’s communication delay, while minimizing its total
power consumption.
A. Soldier’s communication delay
We assume that the soldier (attacker) chooses to connect
with (jam) the IoBT network at each step, sequentially, until
the soldier arrives at D. The soldier communicates with each
IoBT device x ∈ X over a downlink channel cx. The signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) γx of the downlink
channel between the soldier and IoBT device x is given by:
γx =
{
PS l
s
x
PAlax+σ
2 , if channel cx is jammed,
PS l
s
x
σ2
, otherwise,
(1)
where PS and PA are, respectively, the transmit powers of
soldier and the attacker. lsx = gsd
−λ
s is the path loss between
the soldier and IoBT device x, with gs being the Rayleigh
fading parameter, ds being the distance between the soldier
and IoBT device x, and λ the path loss exponent. lax = gad
−λ
a
is the path loss between the attacker and the IoBT device x,
with ga being the Rayleigh fading parameter, and da being
the distance between the attacker and the IoBT device x. σ2
is the power of the Gaussian noise. At each step x, based on
the probability distribution of the Rayleigh fading parameter
gs and ga, the probability that the soldier’s received SINR, γx,
is higher than a threshold, γˆ, in one time slot is given by:
qx =
{ ∫∞
V
f (gs) dgs, if channel cx is not jammed,∫∞
0
∫ gs−V
W
0 f (ga) f (gs) dgadgs, otherwise,
(2)
where V = γ̂σ
2
ds
−λPS
, W =
d−λa PAγ̂
d
−λ
s PS
. Here, f (gs) and f (ga)
are the probability density functions of the Rayleigh fading
parameters gs and ga, respectively. In the studied battlefield,
the soldier attempts to maintain a probability of achieving an
SINR exceeding γˆ, qx, that is higher than a threshold qˆ. Hence,
the soldier will request k retransmissions of the downlink data
from IoBT device x. However, the soldier will perform k < k̂
retransmissions, in the case that the channel is occasionally
experiencing a small scale fading. Thus, k is given by:
k =
{ ⌈
log(1−q̂)
log(1−qx)
⌉
, if k < k̂,
k̂, if k ≥ k̂,
(3)
under the goal of maintaining (1− qx)
k
< 1 − q̂. Thus, the
retransmission delay τ of the soldier at each step is given by
ktx. Here, tx =
S
Ix log(1+γx)
is the average unit transmission
delay, which is the average duration of a successful packet
transmission at the physical medium of one resource block,
at step x [15]. S is the size of one resource block, Ix is the
bandwidth of channel cx.
B. Strategies of the players
In the studied battlefield, the objective of the soldier is to
effectively maintain a low transmission delay. Thus, the soldier
will attempt to communicate with the IoBT devices that will
not be attacked. A = {a1, a2} represents the soldier’s action
space at each step x ∈ X . Here, at each step x, a1 ∈ A
indicates that the soldier builds a communication link with
IoBT device x, whereas a2 ∈ A indicates that the soldier does
not communicate with IoBT device x.
On the other hand, the objective of the attacker is to increase
the retransmission delay of the soldier. As such, under a
constraint on its total power consumption, the attacker will
find the best time instant to launch an attack on the IoBT
network, so as to decrease the SINR of the communication
channel between the soldier and IoBT network. The attacker’s
set of the possible actions at each step x can be represented by
B = {b1, b2}. Here, action b1 ∈ B indicates that the attacker
chooses to compromise the IoBT network, while action b2 ∈ B
indicates that the attacker does not jam the IoBT network. Note
that the jamming power, PK , that will be used by the attacker
is assumed to be constant.
In addition, we use hx to represent the sequence of actions
that have been taken by each of the players before reaching
step x. We refer to hx as the history at step x. In this
respect, the set of all possible histories hx at step x is
denoted by Hx. In addition, we let hˆx denote the sequence
of actions that have been taken by each player up to step
x, including the action pair taken at step x. After observing
history hx ∈ Hx at step x, the soldier and attacker will
find the optimal strategies at the current step to realize their
individual objectives. The set of soldier’s feasible actions at
history hx is, then, represented by Ahx , while the set of
the attacker’s feasible actions at history hx is represented
by Bhx . The actions that are chosen by the soldier and the
attacker at history hx are represented, respectively, by a (hx)
and b (hx). In addition, the set of possible terminal histories
hˆX , at which point the soldier reaches D, is represented by
Z , where Z =
{
HX , (AhX ,BhX )
}
.
In an adversarial IoBT environment, the soldier will ran-
domize its action selection at each history such as to make
it more complex for the attacker to guess the IoBT device to
which the soldier aims to connect. The soldier will, hence,
choose a probability distribution αhx = [α1, α2] over its
feasible action set Ahx at history h
x. In this regard, αi denotes
the probability of choosing action ai ∈ Ahx at history h
x,
where i ∈ {1, 2}. This probability distribution αhx denotes
the soldier’s mixed strategy at history hx. A possible strategy
for the soldier in the battlefield can, then, be represented by
a set α = {αhx |h
x ∈ Hx, x ∈ X }. The set of all feasible
strategies of the soldier is denoted by C.
A similar randomization logic is used by the attacker. The
attacker seeks to choose a probability distribution βhx =
[β1, β2] over its feasible action set Bhx at each history h
x, so
as to maximize the soldier’s transmission delay while keeping
its consumed jamming power at a minimum. In this respect,
βi corresponds to the probability of choosing action bi ∈ Bhx
at history hx, where i ∈ {1, 2}. This probability distribution
βhx is the attacker’s mixed strategy at history h
x. A possible
strategy for the attacker can, hence, be denoted by a set
β = {βhx |h
x ∈ Hx, x ∈ X }. The set of all possible strategies
of the attacker is denoted by D.
C. Material payoff
We define the soldier’s material payoff as the normalized
gap between the sum of the soldier’s actual communication
delay and the soldier’s maximum tolerable communication
delay. Meanwhile, we define the attacker’s material payoff as
the weighted sum of the soldier’s time delay and the attacker’s
power consumption.
Note that, in (2), qx depends on both the soldier and
attacker’s actions a (hx) and b (hx) in the form:
qx (a (h
x) = a1, b (h
x)) =
(
1− 1b(hx)=b1
) ∫ ∞
V
f (gx) dgx
+ 1b(hx)=b1
∫ ∞
0
∫ gx−V
W
0
f (ga) f (gx) dgadgx,
(4)
where 1b(hx)=b1 is an indicator function that only equals to
1 when the current action of the attacker is b1. Hence, the
soldier’s time delay, when attempting to communicate with
x ∈ X at history hx, is given by:
τ (a (hx) = a1, b (h
x))
=
{ ⌈
log(1−qˆ)
log(1−qx(a(hx),b(hx)))
⌉
t, if k < kˆ,
kˆt, otherwise.
(5)
In case the soldier does not communicate with the IoBT
device at history hx, the soldier will naturally not incur any
delay which leads to τ(a(hx) = 2, b(hx)) = 0. As such, the
soldier’s retransmission delay is a function of the soldier’s and
attacker’s actions. At the terminal history hˆX , the soldier’s
accumulated communication delay will be:
τ
(
hˆX
)
=
X∑
v=1
τ(a (hv) , b (hv)), (6)
where a (hv) and b (hv) represent, respectively, the soldier’s
and attacker’s action at step v in hˆX . Note that, under
each terminal history hˆX ∈ Z ,
X∑
v=1
1a(hv)=a1 = J and
X∑
v=1
PK1b(hv)=b1 ≤ E. Here, we note that, even though
not communicating with any device will lead to a minimum
delay for the soldier, this is not a feasible strategy for the
soldier, since by definition, the soldier has to communicate
with 0 < J ≤ X devices in the battlefield so as to acquire
situational awareness. Based on its primary objective, the
soldier will determine an optimal strategy α that minimize its
expected total time delay. This, hence, requires maximizing the
normalized gap between the cumulative retransmission delay
and the maximum tolerable delay, which is defined as :
π (α, β) =
∆−
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qα,β
(
hˆX
)
τ
(
hˆX
)
∆
, (7)
where Qα,β
(
hˆX
)
is the probability of occurrence of terminal
history hˆX ∈ Z , and is induced by the soldier’s and the
attacker’s mixed-strategies, α and β as follow:
Qα,β
(
hˆX
)
=
X∏
x=1
(
αhx (1)1a(hx)=a1 + αhx (2)1a(hx)=a2
)
×
(
βhx (1)1b(hx)=b1 + βhx (2)1b(hx)=b2
)
,
(8)
where history hx is part of hˆX . In other words, hx represents
the sequence of actions in hˆX taken before x. Hence, π(α, β)
represents the soldier’s expected utility (or, equivalently, ex-
pected material payoff) achieved under the strategy pair (α, β).
Meanwhile, the material payoff of the attacker at the termi-
nal history hˆX is defined as
π′0
(
hˆX
)
=
θ1
X∑
v=1
τ(a (hv) , b (hv))
∆
+ θ2
E −
X∑
v=1
PK1b(hv)=b1
E
, (9)
where θ1 ≥ 0 and θ2 ≥ 0 represent, respectively, the weight
of time delay and power consumption, with θ1+θ2 = 1. Thus,
in this battlefield, the attacker will select the optimal strategy
β that maximizes the soldier’s time delay1, while minimizing
its power consumption, which can be captured by maximizing
the following expected utility (i.e. expected material payoff):
π′ (α, β) =
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qα,β
(
hˆX
)
π′0
(
hˆX
)
. (10)
In this battlefield, the attacker can track the soldier’s location
via GPS, and it can gather intelligence (i.e., knowledge) on the
soldier’s associated objective. However, it does not know the
IoBT devices to which the soldier will connect. Meanwhile,
the soldier knows that the attacker is present, but does not
know which IoBT devices it will target. Then, to determine
their optimal actions at each history, the soldier and attacker
aim at forming an estimation of their opponent’s actions (e.g.
the attacker estimates the soldier’s actions, and the soldier
estimates the attacker’s actions). This estimation is defined
as the soldier and attacker’s first-order beliefs on each other.
Let δ1hx =
[
δ1hx (1) , δ
1
hx (2)
]
be the soldier’s vector of beliefs
on the probability distribution of the attacker’s actions b1 and
1Here, we assume that ∆ can be learnt by the attacker using its knowledge
of the IoBT devices’ quantity and channel condition, or through, for example,
a prior reconnaissance phase about the soldier and its objectives.
b2 at history h
x, and let ρ1hx =
[
ρ1hx (1) , ρ
1
hx (2)
]
be the
attacker’s belief vector on the probability distribution of the
soldier’s actions a1 and a2 at history h
x, respectively. As such,
we let δ1Hx and ρ
1
Hx , denote the set of first-order beliefs of,
respectively, the soldier and attacker for each possible history
at step x. Hereinafter, we use δ1 =
{
δ1H1 , · · · , δ
1
HX
}
to
denote a set of soldier’s first-order beliefs on the attacker, and
ρ1 =
{
ρ1
H1
, · · · ,ρ1
HX
}
to denote a set of attacker’s first-order
beliefs on the soldier, at each possible history.
Based on belief δ1, the soldier’s perceived (i.e. belief-based)
expected material payoff will be given by:
π
(
α, δ1
)
=
∆−
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qα,δ1
(
hˆX
)
τ
(
hˆX
)
∆
, (11)
where Qα,δ1
(
hˆX
)
is the belief-based probability of occur-
rence of the terminal history hˆX ∈ Z induced by α and δ1:
Qα,δ1
(
hˆX
)
=
X∏
x=1
(
αhx (1)1a(hx)=a1 + αhx (2)1a(hx)=a2
)
×
(
δ1hx (1)1b(hx)=b1 + δ
1
hx (2)1b(hx)=b2
)
.
(12)
Similarly, given its first-order belief ρ1, the attacker’s
perceived (i.e. belief-based) expected material payoff under
strategy β will be:
π
′
(
β, ρ
1
)
=
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qρ1,β
(
hˆ
X
)
π
′
0
(
hˆ
X
)
, (13)
where Qρ1,β
(
hˆX
)
is the belief-based probability of occur-
rence of the terminal history hˆX ∈ Z induced by ρ1 and β:
Qρ1,β
(
hˆX
)
=
X∏
x=1
(
ρ1hx (1)1a(hx)=a1 + ρ
1
hx (2)1a(hx)=a2
)
×
(
βhx (1)1b(hx)=b1 + βhx (2)1b(hx)=b2
)
.
(14)
D. Game formulation
In the studied IoBT scenario, the primary objective of
the soldier is to find a strategy to effectively evade the
jamming attack of the attacker, while the objective of the
attacker is to find an attack strategy that effectively jams the
soldier’s communication with the IoBT devices. As such, we
formulate a dynamic game [P ,H,Z, π, π′, π, π′] to capture
the dependence between the objectives and the actions of the
soldier and the attacker. Here, P is the set of players which
includes the soldier and attacker. H is the set of histories
representing the sequence of actions that have been taken by
each of the players before reaching a certain stage, and Z
represents the set of terminal histories, at which point the
soldier reaches its destination, D, and the game ends. π and
π′ are the expected utilities of the soldier and the attacker,
respectively, defined in (7) and (10), while π¯ and π¯′ are their
belief-dependent (i.e. perceived) expected utilities, defined in
(11) and (13). In this formulated game, each of the soldier and
the attacker aim at maximizing their (belief-based) expected
utilities. When the beliefs of each player accurately predict
the strategy of the opponent, and when each player chooses
a strategy that maximizes its expected utility based on those
beliefs, these strategies give rise to a Nash equilibrium (NE)
for the proposed game, which is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium (NE) for the formulated
dynamic game is defined as
(
α∗, β∗, ρ1∗, δ1∗
)
, in which α∗,
and β∗ are rational, such that:
α∗ ∈ argmax
α∈C
π
(
α, δ1∗
)
, (15)
β∗ ∈ argmax
β∈D
π′
(
β, ρ1∗
)
, (16)
while beliefs ρ1∗ and δ1∗ are error-free such that for all an ∈
Ahx at each history h
x in the game:
ρ1∗hx (n) = α
∗
hx (n) , (17)
and for all bm ∈ Bhx at each history h
x in the game:
δ1∗hx (m) = β
∗
hx (m) . (18)
Thus, at an NE of the proposed game, both the soldier
and attacker correctly estimate their opponents’ strategies
(represented by an error-free set of beliefs over the opponent’s
strategy) and make rational determinations on their strategies
based on their error-free beliefs, at every history of the
game. As shown in Definition 1, the rational strategies of the
players (i.e. the soldier and the attacker) are the strategies
that maximize the players’ error-free belief-based perceived
expected payoff, π and π′. At each history hx ∈ Hx, the
players’ error-free first-order beliefs (i.e. δ1∗ and ρ1∗) on
each of their opponents’ feasible action (i.e. bm ∈ Bhx ,
an ∈ Ahx ) equals the probability that their opponents choose
this action with their rational strategies (i.e. α∗ and β∗). The
players, including the soldier and the attacker, are considered
to hold accurate (error-free) beliefs in the computation of
their respective NE strategies. Hence, these error-free beliefs
require that, at equilibrium, beliefs should accurately predict
the opponent’s strategy. However, in practical networks, the
players’ beliefs may not be fully accurate, when no effective
prediction method is used. Hence, when solving (15) and (16),
the resulting soldier and attacker strategies are rational (i.e.
optimal), but are based on their respective beliefs. If these
beliefs are not accurate (i.e. if (17) and (18) are not met),
even through each of the players is still acting rationally, their
strategies may deviate from the NE strategies.
Moreover, in practice, as emotional human players, the
soldier and the attacker may also deviate from their NE
strategies [16]. In this case, despite being theoretically valid,
the error-free beliefs, δ1∗ and ρ1∗ defined in Definition 1 may
not be consistent with the players’ actual emotional strategies.
As such, the rational strategies, α∗ and β∗, that maximize the
players’ δ1∗-based and ρ1∗-based perceived expected payoffs,
may not maximize the players real expected payoffs when
the opponent deviates from its fully rational strategies, due to
behavioral factors [11]. In addition, the soldier’s and attacker’s
subjective emotions may also modify their objective functions
to incorporate additional subjective goals. These psychological
facets of the player’s behavior in an IoBT network, are studied
next using the framework of a dynamic psychological game
[11].
III. DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGICAL GAME
The formulated dynamic game in Section II captures the
primary objectives of the soldier and attacker and the in-
terdependence between these objectives. In this respect, in
this game, each player, by using a set of beliefs about the
opponent’s strategy, aims at computing its optimal strategy
to maximize its respective expected utility. Hence, the beliefs
are considered to be solely a means using which a player can
estimate its opponent’s strategy in order to choose its optimal
strategy, but are not considered a part of the utility function
of each player. However, given the psychological (i.e. human)
nature of the players in our game, their expectations, beliefs,
and emotions have a direct effect on the way they perceive the
outcome of the game. Indeed, by not achieving their expected
(or belief-based) payoff, the soldier or attacker will experience
frustration or anger, which has a direct impact on the way they
assess and perceive the outcome of the game. In addition, due
to the adversarial nature of the relationship between the soldier
and attacker, in addition to achieving their own objective
by maximizing/minimizing the communication delay, each
may also strive to intentionally hurt the opponent, by aiming
at frustrating the opponent or, more generally, causing a
psychological (i.e. emotional) damage to this opponent. Hence,
incorporating this psychological aspect in the formulation of
the utility functions of each player enables a more general and
representative game analysis that can realistically capture the
psychological decision making processes and behavior of each
of the soldier and attacker.
To this end, we next incorporate notions from psychological
games [11] in our game formulation to capture and analyze this
psychological aspect of the decision making processes of the
attacker and soldier. As such, in our introduced psychological
game, the players expectations and beliefs will now be directly
incorporated in their utility functions. In addition, given their
objective to frustrate and anger the opponent, each player aims
at anticipating the payoff that the opponent expects. To this
end, in addition to building beliefs over the opponent strate-
gies, each player also aims at building a belief system over
the opponent’s beliefs. This would, hence, enable anticipating
the expectations of the opponent and, as a result, maximize its
frustration.
A. Psychology in the battlefield
In the aforementioned IoBT scenario, when one player (i.e.
the soldier or the attacker) chooses its strategy such that its
opponent receives a material payoff lower than expected, this
player successfully frustrates its opponent. For example, if the
soldier believes that the attacker did not launch an attack on
the IoBT network at step x, it will communicate with this
IoBT device x and expect to achieve a material payoff π. If,
in reality, the attacker attacked x, then the material payoff
of the soldier will decrease to π˜. The gap between π and π˜
quantifies the soldier’s frustration. Note that the soldier and
attacker only feel frustrated when they get a lower material
payoff, compared to their expected material payoff. Hence,
in our proposed psychological game formulation, the soldier
and attacker will intentionally attempt to frustrate each other
while also seeking to achieve their own, individual objectives.
Ultimately, the soldier and attacker’s intention to frustrate
each other, combined with their individual objectives (i.e. to
minimize or maximize the soldier’s communication delay),
will determine the soldier and attacker’s strategies in the
battlefield.
To consider their opponents’ frustration in their own pay-
offs, the soldier and attacker should estimate their opponent’s
expected payoffs. This estimation requires the soldier and
the attacker to build beliefs about their opponent’s first-order
beliefs, i.e. to build second-order beliefs. The soldier’s second-
order belief on the attacker’s first-order belief at history hx,
ρ1hx , is denoted by a vector δ
2
hx =
[
δ2hx (1) , δ
2
hx (2)
]
. The
attacker’s second-order belief on the soldier’s belief δ1hx is
denoted by ρ2hx =
[
ρ2hx (1) , ρ
2
hx (2)
]
. Hereinafter, we use
δ2 =
{
δ2H1 , · · · , δ
2
HX
}
to denote the set of soldier’s second-
order beliefs on the attacker, and ρ2 =
{
ρ2
H1
, · · · ,ρ2
HX
}
to
denote the set of attacker’s second-order beliefs on the soldier,
for each possible history.
B. Soldier and attacker’s frustration
We define the soldier’s and attacker’s frustration as the gap
between their expected material payoffs, respectively defined
in (11) and (13), and their actual material payoffs. This frustra-
tion, indeed, stems from the fact that the soldier (attacker) may
choose an action an ∈ Ahx (bm ∈ Bhx) that may be different
from what the attacker (soldier) has anticipated based on its
belief ρ1hx (δ
1
hx). Thus, in the considered IoBT network, under
terminal history hˆX , the soldier’s frustration with strategy α
and belief δ1 will be given by (given that the soldier aims at
maximizing π defined in (11)):
F
(
α, δ1, hˆX
)
=
[
π
(
α, δ1
)
− π˜
(
hˆX
)]+
, (19)
where [x]
+
= max {0, x}. π˜
(
hˆX
)
=
∆−τ(hˆX)
∆
is the
soldier’s actual payoff under terminal history hˆX . Note that
the attacker has no knowledge of the soldier’s first-order
belief, δ1, and strategy, α. Hence, based on its sets of first-
order and second-order beliefs, ρ1 and ρ2, on the soldier’s
strategy α and first-order belief δ1, the attacker can form a
belief-based perception of the soldier’s frustration, denoted
by Fa(ρ
1, ρ2, hˆX), when a terminal history hˆX occurs, is
expressed as follows:
Fa
(
ρ1, ρ2, hˆX
)
=
[
π
(
ρ1, ρ2
)
− π˜
(
hˆX
)]+
, (20)
where π
(
ρ1, ρ2
)
=
∆−
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qρ1,ρ2(hˆ
X)τ(hˆX)
∆
. In addition,
Qρ1,ρ2
(
hˆX
)
is the attacker’s perceived belief-based proba-
bility of occurrence of the terminal histories hˆX ∈ Z induced
by its first-order and second-order beliefs, ρ1 and ρ2:
Qρ1,ρ2
(
hˆX
)
=
X∏
x=1
(
ρ1hx (1)1a(hx)=a1 + ρ
1
hx (2)1a(hx)=a2
)
×
(
ρ2hx (1)1b(hx)=b1 + ρ
2
hx (2)1b(hx)=b2
)
.
(21)
Thus, combining the attacker’s primary objective of max-
imizing the soldier’s communication delay at a minimum
needed total jamming power with its intention to frustrate
the soldier results in the following belief-based expected
psychological payoff (i.e. belief-based expected psychological
utility):
u
′
(
β, ρ
1
, ρ
2
)
= π
′
(
β, ρ
1
)
+ ωa
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qρ1,β
(
hˆ
X
)
Fa
(
ρ
1
, ρ
2
, hˆ
X
)
, (22)
where ωa ∈ [0, 1] is a parameters that represents the attacker’s
motivation and willingness to frustrate the soldier.
Similarly, under history hˆX , the frustration of the attacker
with strategy β, under the first-order belief ρ1, will be:
F ′
(
β, ρ1, hˆX
)
=
[
π′
(
β, ρ1
)
− π′0
(
hˆX
)]+
, (23)
where π′0
(
hˆX
)
is the attacker’s actual payoff at terminal
history, as defined in (9). Based on its first-order and second-
order beliefs, δ1 and δ2, the soldier can form a belief-based
perception of qualify the attacker’s frustration, denoted by
Fs(δ
1, δ2, hˆX), when terminal history hˆX is achieved, as
follows:
Fs
(
δ1, δ2, hˆX
)
=
[
π′
(
δ1, δ2
)
− π′0
(
hˆX
)]+
, (24)
where π′
(
δ1, δ2
)
=
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qδ2,δ1
(
hˆX
)
π′0
(
hˆX
)
. Here,
Qδ2,δ1
(
hˆX
)
is the perceived belief-based probability of oc-
currence of terminal history hˆX ∈ Z based on the soldier’s
first-order and second-order beliefs, δ1 and δ2, and is defined
as:
Qδ2,δ1
(
hˆX
)
=
X∏
x=1
(
δ2hx (1)1a(hx)=a1 + δ
2
hx (2)1a(hx)=a2
)
×
(
δ1hx (1)1b(hx)=b1 + δ
1
hx (2)1b(hx)=b2
)
.
(25)
Then, the soldier’s goal to minimize its expected commu-
nication delay combined with its intention to frustrate the at-
tacker can be captured by the following belief-based expected
psychological payoff (i.e. belief-based expected psychological
utility):
u
(
α, δ
1
, δ
2
)
= π
(
α, δ
1
)
+ ωs
∑
hˆX∈Z
Qα,δ1
(
hˆ
X
)
Fs
(
δ
1
, δ
2
, hˆ
X
)
, (26)
where ωs ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that represents the soldier’s
motivation to frustrate the attacker.
C. Dynamic Psychological game
To capture the decision making processes of of the soldier
and attacker, we introduce a dynamic psychological game
[P ,H,Z, u, u′], where, similarly to the dynamic game defined
in Section II-E, P is the set of players including the soldier
and attacker. H is the set of histories, and Z is the set of
terminal histories. In addition, u and u′ represent the soldier’s
and the attacker’s psychological expected utility defined in (26)
and (22), respectively. In this psychological game, the soldier
and the attacker aim at maximizing their belief-based psycho-
logical expected utilities. In this regard, when the first-order
and second-order beliefs of each player correctly predict the
strategy and the first-order belief of the opponent, and when
each player chooses a strategy that maximizes its belief-based
psychological expected utility based on those correct beliefs,
these strategies give rise to a psychological equilibrium (PE)
[11]. In this respect, the PE of our proposed psychological
game is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2. The psychological equilibrium of the formulated
psychological game is defined as
(
α∗, β∗, δ1∗, δ2∗, ρ1∗, ρ2∗
)
,
in which α∗, and β∗ are rational, such that:
α∗ ∈ argmax
α∈C
u
(
α, δ1∗, δ2∗,
)
, (27)
β∗ ∈ argmax
β∈D
u′
(
β, ρ1∗, ρ2∗,
)
, (28)
while the first-order and second-order beliefs, δ1∗, δ2∗, ρ1∗,
and ρ2∗, are error-free such that for all an ∈ Ahx at each
history hx:
δ2∗hx (n) = ρ
1∗
hx (n) = α
∗
hx (n) , (29)
and for all bm ∈ Bhx at each history h
x:
ρ2∗hx (m) = δ
1∗
hx (m) = β
∗
hx (m) . (30)
The principal difference between the PE and the NE (which
is an underlying difference between the proposed standard
dynamic game and the proposed psychological game) is that
the utility function of each player is not only dependent on
the strategy or action chosen by the opponent, but also on the
opponent’s beliefs. In this regard, the payoff of each player
in the psychological game does not only depend on what the
opponent does, but also on what the opponent thinks. This
enlarges the domain of analysis of the game to incorporate psy-
chological aspects of the players’ decision making processes,
which are not typically present in a traditional dynamic game
formulation. Hence, even though the definition of the PE still
requires that the first-order and second-order beliefs of each
player are error-free, since these beliefs are incorporated in
the payoffs of each player, they will have a direct effect on
their rationally chosen (i.e. PE) strategies. In essence, at a PE,
the players’ intention to frustrate one another is captured, as
the soldier and the attacker make rational determination on
their strategies to maximize both their belief-based expected
material payoff and their opponents’ frustration, based on their
error-free first-order and second-order beliefs. Based on [11],
there always exists at least one such PE in the formulated
psychological game. In particular, under the assumptions that
i) evaded attacks at history hx yield higher expected material
payoffs for the soldier and lower expected material payoffs
for the attacker, at the current and future histories, and ii) a
successful (unjammed) communication at history hx yields a
higher expected material payoff for the soldier and a lower
expected material payoff for the attacker, at the current and
future histories, we can derive Theorem 1 and Theorem 2:
Theorem 1. The NE and the PE of, respectively, the conven-
tional dynamic game and the psychological game are unique.
Proof. At history hx ∈ Hx, the soldier chooses its action
from {a1, a2}, while the attacker chooses its action from
{b1, b2}. We represent the soldier’s and attacker’s payoffs
when the soldier takes action an and the attacker takes action
bm, where n,m ∈ {1, 2}, by πn,m and π
′
n,m, respectively.
Here, πn,m and π
′
n,m include the instantaneous payoffs the
soldier and attacker receive when taking their action pair at
history hx as well as future expected payoffs at the following
histories. As such, under each combination of the soldier’s
and attacker’s pure strategies at hx, the soldier’s possible
payoffs are represented by π1,1, π1,2, π2,1 and π2,2, while
the attacker’s payoffs are represented by π′1,1, π
′
1,2, π
′
2,1
and π′2,2. Note that, here, we consider that the following
inequalities hold: π1,2 > π2,2 ≥ π1,1, and π2,1 > π2,2 ≥ π1,1.
Indeed, π1,2 > π2,2 reflects the gain that the soldier receives
from communicating with the IoBT network without being
jammed by the attacker, while π2,2 ≥ π1,1 reflects the loss
the attacker incurs from attempting to communicate with a
jammed IoBT network. In addition, π2,1 > π2,2 reflects
the gain the soldier will receive in future steps due to the
attacker wasting some of its jamming power when the soldier
had not attempted to communicate with the IoBT network.
Similarly, we also consider the following inequalities to hold:
π′1,1 ≥ π
′
2,2 > π
′
1,2, π
′
1,1 ≥ π
′
2,2 > π
′
2,1. These
inequalities correspond to considering that: i) evaded attacks
at history hx yield higher expected material payoffs for the
soldier and lower expected material payoffs for the attacker,
at the current and future histories, and ii) a successful (un-
jammed) communication at history hx yields a higher expected
material payoff for the soldier and a lower expected material
payoff for the attacker, at the current and future histories.
In this respect, we can compute the psychological payoff
of the soldier and the attacker under each combination of
these pure strategies. In this regard, we consider α′ to be
the attacker’s belief representing the probability with which
the attacker believes that the soldier will choose action a1. In
addition, we consider β′ to be the belief that the soldier has,
representing the probability with which the soldier believes
that the attacker will choose action b1. Under the correctness
of beliefs defined in (29) and (30) of the PE, these probabilities
also reflect the second-order beliefs of the players as well as
the actual strategies chosen by each of the players. Starting
from the soldier’s side, the soldier’s psychological payoffs at
the strategy pairs {a1, b1} and {a1, b2} are, respectively, π1,1
and π1,2+ωs (1− α
′) (π′2,2 − π
′
1,2). In addition, psycholog-
ical payoffs of the soldier at the pure strategy pairs {a2, b1}
and {a2, b2} are, respectively, π2,1 +ωsα
′ (π′1,1 − π
′
2,1) and
π2,2. On the other hand, the attacker’s psychological pay-
offs at strategy pairs {a1, b1} and {a1, b2} are, respectively,
π′1,1 + ωa (1− β
′) (π1,2 − π1,1) and π
′
1,2. In addition, the
attacker’s psychological payoffs at strategy pairs {a2, b1} and
{a2, b2} are, respectively, π
′
2,1 and π
′
2,2+ωaβ
′ (π2,1 − π2,2).
In the conventional dynamic game, in which the frustrations
of the soldier and attacker are not considered in their oppo-
nent’s utility functions, we denote the soldier’s and attacker’s
strategies by [α, 1− α] and [β, 1− β], respectively. By using
the indifference principle, we can compute the NE strategy
of the soldier, which results in α =
pi′
2,2−pi
′
2,1
pi′
1,1+pi
′
2,2−pi
′
1,2−pi
′
2,1
,
and the NE strategy of the attacker, which results in β =
pi2,2−pi1,2
pi1,1+pi2,2−pi1,2−pi2,1
. Here, we note that this computed NE
is unique since it can be shown that no NE exists in pure
strategies, under our considered set of inequalities defined
at the start of the proof, and the solution of the equations
resulting from the indifference principle results in unique
mixed-strategies α and β.
Now, considering the psychological game, we denote the
soldier’s and the attacker’s strategies at the PE by [α′, 1− α′]
and [β′, 1− β′], respectively. By using the indifference prin-
ciple, with the soldier and the attacker holding correct (i.e.
error-free) beliefs on one another, we can compute the PE
strategies as follows:
α′ =
ωaβ
′ (π2,1 − π2,2) +
(
π′2,2 − π
′
2,1
)
D′ + ωa [β′ (π2,1 − π2,2) + (1− β′) (π1,2 − π1,1)]
, (31)
β′ =
ωs (1− α
′) (π′2,2 − π
′
1,2) + (π1,2 − π2,2)
D + ωs [(1− α′) (π′2,2 − π′1,2) + α′ (π′1,1 − π′2,1)]
.
(32)
where D = π1,2 + π2,1 − π1,1 − π2,2, D
′ = π′1,1 + π
′
2,2 −
π′1,2 − π
′
2,1. Note that, in (31), when β
′ = 0, α′ < α, when
β′ = 1, α′ > α. At the same time, in (32), when β′ = 0, α′ =
1+
pi1,2−pi2,2
ωs(pi′2,2−pi
′
1,2)
> α, when β′ = 1, α′ =
pi1,1−pi2,1
ωs(pi′1,1−pi′2,1)
< α.
Hereinafter, we rewrite (31) as:
α′ =
F3β
′ + F4
F1β′ + F2
, (33)
where F1 = ωa (π2,1 + π1,1 − π1,2 − π2,2), F2 = π
′
2,2 −
π′2,1 + π
′
1,1 − π
′
1,2 + ωa (π1,2 − π1,1) > 0, F3 =
ωa (π2,1 − π2,2) > 0, F4 = π
′
2,2 − π
′
2,1 > 0. Meanwhile,
in (33), ∂α
′
∂β′
= F2F3−F1F4
(F1β′+F2)
2 . Note that, when π
′
2,2 − π
′
2,1 ≥
θ1 (π2,1 − π2,2), we can prove that F2F3 − F1F4 > 0,
which implies that, in (31), α′ increases with an increase in
β′ ∈ [0, 1].
Meanwhile, we rewrite equation (32) with:
α′ =
F ′3β
′ + F ′4
F ′1β
′ + F ′2
, (34)
where F ′1 = ωs
(
π′1,2 + π
′
1,1 − π
′
2,1 − π
′
2,2
)
, F ′2 =
ωs
(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
> 0, F ′3 = −D−ωs
(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
< 0, F ′4 =
π1,2−π2,2+ωs
(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
> 0. In (34), ∂α
′
∂β′
=
F ′
2
F ′
3
−F ′
1
F ′
4
(F ′1β′+F ′2)
2 .
Here, F ′2F
′
3 − F
′
1F
′
4 ≤ ωs
(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
(π1,1 − π2,1) < 0.
Thus ∂α
′
∂β′
< 0, which implies that, in (32), α′ decreases with
an increase in β′ ∈ [0, 1].
In conclusion, when β′ = 0, α′ in (31) is smaller than α′ in
(32), while when β′ = 1, α′ in (31) is larger than α′ in (32). In
(31), α′ is strictly increasing in β′, while, in (32), α′ is strictly
decreasing in β′. As such, for 0 ≤ β′ ≤ 1, (31) and (32) has 1
intersection point. This implies that the solution obtained from
the indifference principle is unique and there is a unique PE
in mixed strategies. In addition, given the inequalities stated at
the beginning of the proof, it can be readily shown that no PE
exists in pure strategies. Therefore, under the considered set
of inequalities, the PE of the game is unique. This completes
the proof.
The incorporation of the opponent’s beliefs in the objective
function of each player, and the possible willingness of each
player to not only meet its own objective but to frustrate the
opponent, introduce significant modifications to the equilib-
rium strategies of each player as shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. In the psychological game, at the PE, the attacker
is more likely to target the IoBT device having the best channel
conditions as compared to the NE of the traditional dynamic
game.
Proof. In (32), when β′ = β, we can get:
α′ =
ωs
(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
(π2,1 − π1,1)
ωs
[(
π′2,2 − π
′
1,2
)
(π2,1 − π1,1) +
(
π′1,1 − π
′
2,1
)
(π1,2 − π2,2)
]
(35)
such that α′ ≥ 12 , since π
′
1,1− π
′
2,1 ≤ θ1 (π2,1 − π1,1), π
′
2,2 −
π′1,2 ≥ θ1 (π1,2 − π2,2). In (31), when β
′ = β, α′ < 12 if
π2,1 < π1,2. As such, if π2,1 < π1,2 (i.e. if the current IoBT
device exhibits the best channel as compared to all future IoBT
devices), β′ > β, at the intersection of (31) and (32), as shown
in Fig. 2. Indeed, π1,2 > π2,1 reflects the gain that the soldier
receives from communicating with the current IoBT device is
larger than the gain it may potentially receive if it successfully
communicates with the IoBT network in future steps. Thus,
when there is no remaining IoBT devices in future steps, which
have a better channel as compared to the current device, the
attacker will be more likely to attack the current device. This
completes the proof.
Hence, Theorem 2 shows the effect that the incorporation of
beliefs in each player’s objective function (as in the proposed
psychological game) can have on their equilibrium strategies.
In particular, even when the beliefs are error-free, the fact
1
1
0.5
0
α '
β 'β
β ',α '( )
PE strategy:
(31)
(32)
Fig. 2. α′ versus β′.
that the beliefs have a direct effect on how the outcome of
the game is assessed by each player has a direct impact on
the chosen equilibrium strategies. Indeed, Theorem 2 shows
that, for the attacker, incorporating a belief over the soldier’s
strategy and a belief over the soldier’s belief in its objective
function allows the attacker to modify its equilibrium strategy
in order to maximize the soldier’s frustration.
In summary, the formulated psychological game enables
analysis of the soldier’s and attacker’s psychological intention
to frustrate each other and allows studying the effect of
such a psychological decision making aspect on the chosen
strategies of each player. As can be seen from Definition 2 and
conditions (29) and (30), holding correct beliefs is necessary
to reach a PE of the game. This highlights the importance
of the beliefs and the effect that they have on the chosen
soldier and attacker strategies. In practical applications, in
which each player may not have the ability to analytically
characterize a set of error-free beliefs, a learning algorithm
could be applied to numerically synthesize these beliefs [17],
[18]. To this end, a Bayesian updating based algorithm is
proposed next, which enables a numerical computation of
first-order and second-order beliefs of each player, which as
a result, allows computation of equilibrium strategies of the
psychological game.
IV. LEARNING TO BE RATIONAL IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
GAME
In the studied IoBT scenario, the soldier and attacker form
first-order and second-order beliefs, which are used to compute
their optimal (i.e. rational) strategy. As such, as shown in
Definition 2, the PE strategies require the players to form
correct (i.e. error-free) beliefs. Forming such beliefs analyt-
ically is a typically complex task especially when the size
of the battlefield grows, which leads to having a significantly
large number of possible histories in the game. Hence, rather
than relying on complex analytical derivations, the soldier and
attacker can rely on numerical techniques and observations to
form such beliefs, and as a result, choose their strategies. A
powerful tool which can be used to form the players’ beliefs
in our proposed psychological game is Bayesian updating
[19], which enables the use of observations to form consistent
beliefs. Hence, next, we develop a Bayesian updating based
approach to solve the proposed psychological game, by first
predicting the players’ future strategies and beliefs.
By using Bayesian updating, the attacker and the soldier
find, at each history hx in the game, find the posterior
probabilities as follows:
Pr (an |h
x ) =
Pr (hx |an ) Pr (an)
Pr (hx)
, (36)
Pr (bm |h
x ) =
Pr (hx |bm ) Pr (bm)
Pr (hx)
, (37)
where Pr (an |h
x ) represents the probability of the soldier
choosing action an at history h
x, while Pr (bm |h
x ) is the
probability of the attacker choosing action bm at history h
x.
Pr (hx |an ) represents the probability that the current history
is hx when the soldier chooses action an at step x. Pr (h
x |bm )
represents the probability that the current history is hx when
the soldier chooses action bm at step x. Pr (an) and Pr (bm),
respectively, represent the probabilities that action an or bm is
chosen at step x. Pr (hx) represents the probability that history
hx is reached at step x.
Under Bayesian updating, the soldier and the attacker build
their first-order beliefs on their opponent’s strategy, under
each history hx, according to (36) and (37). Meanwhile,
based on Definition 2, the soldier and attacker’s second-order
beliefs are consistent with their own strategies. Based on
their beliefs, the soldier and attacker determine their optimal
strategies that maximize their belief-dependent utilities in (22)
and (26). The specific process of our Bayesian updating based
solution is represented in Algorithm 1. Note that, all of
the aforementioned probabilities will be updated through the
repetition of the game2. At the beginning of algorithm, the
soldier and attacker assume Pr (an) = Pr (bm) =
1
2 at each
step x, as there is no reason for them to assume that their
opponents has any preference on the choice of their actions.
Similarly, Pr (hx |an ) =
1
Van,hx
, Pr (hx |bm ) =
1
Vbm,hx
are
assumed at the beginning of the algorithm, with Van,hx , Vbm,hx
representing the total number of times that when an or bm are
respectively chosen, they are chosen from history hx. We also
consider Pr (hx) = 1 when history hx is reached at the first
iteration of the game.
By extending the results in [20] to our formulated psycho-
logical game, when the soldier and the attacker maximize their
payoffs based on their beliefs learnt from Bayesian updating,
their beliefs will always converge to a value that ǫ-likes their
2In practical IoBT scenarios, there will be more than one soldier working
on a same mission. The soldier and the attacker’s beliefs, which are consistent
with the posterior probabilities defined in (36) and (37), are updated through
different soldiers’ accomplishment of the same mission.
Algorithm 1 Bayesian updating solution for the dynamic
psychological game
Input: The set of IoBT devices X in the battlefield, the number of required
communication links between the soldier and IoBT devices J , and the
power limitation of the attacker E.
Init: Initialize belief of the soldier and attacker.
1: for IoBT device 1 to X do
2: Update Pr (hx).
3: Calculate Pr (an |hx ), Pr (bm |hx ), with δ2∗hx (n) = ρ
1∗
hx (n) =
Pr (an |hx ), ρ2∗hx (m) = δ
1∗
hx (m) = Pr (bm |h
x ).
4: for the attacker do
5: for all action bm ∈ Bhx do
6: Estimate the soldier expected material payoff based on ρ2∗hx .
7: end for
8: Find b∗ (hx) = argmax
bm∈Bhx
u′.
9: Update Pr (bm), Pr (hx |bm ), for all an ∈ Ahx .
10: end for
11: for the soldier do
12: for all action an ∈ Ahx do
13: Estimate the attacker’s expected material payoff based on δ2∗hx .
14: end for
15: Find a∗ (hx) = argmax
an∈Ahx
u.
16: Update Pr (an), Pr (hx |an ), for all bm ∈ Bhx .
17: end for
18: end for
opponents’ strategies and beliefs. Here, a first-order belief at
history hx, δ1hx =
[
δ1hx (1) , δ
1
hx (2)
]
, is said to ǫ-like a player’s
strategy (i.e. βhx = [β1, β2]) when there exists an ǫ > 0, such
that (i)
2∑
n=1
δ1hx (n) and
2∑
n=1
βn are greater than 1 − ǫ; (ii)
(1− ǫ)βn ≤ δ
1
hx (n) ≤ (1 + ǫ)βn, for n ∈ {1, 2}. During the
Bayesian updating process, the soldier and the attacker predict
their opponent’s strategies based on the sequence of actions
that the soldier and attacker had taken during the updating
process. In this regard, each player, including the soldier and
the attacker, optimizes its utilities based on the beliefs learned
from the actual strategies played in the game. Hence, learning
a belief system over the strategy the opponent takes at a certain
history requires this history to be reached during the learning
process. Hence, if the sequence of actions taken by the soldier
and attacker do not lead to a certain history to be reached,
the player’s cannot use previous observations to build a belief
system over that particular history. As such, based on the
Bayesian updating and optimal strategy selection, the soldier
and the attacker are guaranteed to reach an ǫ-like psychological
self-confirming equilibrium (PSCE) defined as follow [21].
Definition 3. The ǫ-like PSCE of the formulated dynamic
psychological game is defined as
(
α∗, β∗, δ1∗, δ2∗, ρ1∗, ρ2∗
)
,
where α∗, and β∗ are rational; while ρ1∗, δ1∗, ρ2∗, and δ2∗
respectively ǫ-like α∗, β∗, δ1∗, ρ1∗, for each history hx such
that Pr (α∗, β∗ |hx ) > 0.
As such, in an ǫ-like PSCE, the soldier and the attacker’s
beliefs, which are updated based on previous actions that
have been taken in the battlefield, ǫ-like the error-free beliefs,
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS [22]
Parameter Value Parameter Value
PS 20 dBm PA 20 dBm
J = J ′ 1 ∆ 80 ms
θ1 = θ2 0.5 ωs = ωa 0.5
Ix 20 MHz σ
2 -95 dBm
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Fig. 3. The soldier and attacker’s strategy in the battlefield.
defined in the PE of this game. Hence, using the Bayesian
updating process, the soldier and the attacker can dynamically
predict their opponent’s strategy. As such, rational strategies
that maximize each player’s payoff can be reached upon the
convergence of the Bayesian updating algorithm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a battlefield in which
multiple IoBT devices are randomly distributed along the
soldier’s path. The channel gain between the soldier and each
IoBT device follows a Rayleigh distribution with unit variance.
The parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table I.
The Bayesian updating based PSCE results, denoted by BU
herinafter, are compared to the NE and PE results.
Fig. 3 shows the way in which the soldier and attacker
make decisions in an IoBT network with 3 devices, using the
Bayesian updating algorithm. Fig. 3 shows that, at each history
in the game, the soldier (attacker) makes decisions on whether
to communicate with (attack) the current device or not, based
on their prediction on their opponent’s strategies and beliefs.
The soldier’s belief on the attacker is updated based on the
Bayesian updating algorithm. For example, at a certain history
hx in the game, an IoBT device is attacked 22.35%×M times
in M iterations of the Bayesian updating algorithm, where
history hx is always reached at step x. As such, when history
hx is reached in theM+1-th iteration of the Bayesian updating
algorithm, the soldier will believe that the attacker will attack
the current IoBT device with a probability 22.35%. Note that,
the soldier updates its beliefs based on the actual strategies
played in the game. As the number of soldiers taking the
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same mission is limited, the opportunity with which the soldier
updates its beliefs is limited. Hence, the soldier’s beliefs in the
battlefield may not be error-free since not enough previous
observations are available for the generated beliefs to ǫ-like
the correct strategies. In the following simulation results, the
effect of the players’ non-error-free beliefs will also be studied,
in addition to a complete numerical analysis investigating the
NE, PE, and BU of the proposed games as well as studying
the effects that the various game parameters have on these
equilibria. For the following simulations, we consider 5 IoBT
devices.
Fig. 4 shows the effect that the weights of frustration of
each player (i.e. ωs and ωa) – which reflects the importance
each player assigns on frustrating the opponent – have on
the chosen PE strategies. In this regard, Fig. 4 shows that,
as the weight ωa increases, the probability that the attacker
attacks the best IoBT device increases. Here, the ranking of
best, second best device correspond to the channel quality of
that device. Also, the probability that the attacker attacks the
IoBT devices decreases with the increase of ωa, signifying
that the attacker’s likelihood of launching any jamming attack
decreases. This is due to the fact that, attempting to frustrate
the soldier, the attacker’s strategy can be designed to increase
the likelihood of compromising the best IoBT device along the
path. Meanwhile, since the attacker also aims at minimizing
the total jamming power consumed, its equilibrium strategy
will tend towards attacking the IoBT network with a lower
probability. In addition, Fig. 4 also shows that, as the weight
ωs increases, the probability that the soldier communicates
with the IoBT device with best channel quality increases, as
likelihood of occurrence of attacks decreases. Note that, when
ωs = 0 and ωa = 0, the attacker’s frustration is not considered
in the soldier’s payoff, while the soldier’s frustration is not
considered in the attacker’s payoff, which corresponds to the
NE of the conventional dynamic game introduced in Section
II-E.
Fig. 5 shows the convergence of the soldier’s and attacker’s
strategies using the proposed proposed Bayesian updating
algorithm. Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) show that, as the number
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of iteration increases, the soldier and attacker’s strategies ǫ-
like their PE counterparts, upon convergence. In the results
shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b), Bayesian updating algorithm
approximately requires 210 iterations to reach convergence.
Fig. 6 shows the convergence of the BU expected material
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Fig. 7. The soldier’s and the attacker’s expected material payoffs as the
frustration weights vary (BU results from 10 iterations in Algorithm 1).
payoffs of the soldier and attacker, as their BU beliefs as well
as their BU strategies in Fig. 5 converge. Fig. 5 also shows
that, when the player’s belief are not error-free, their strategies
will not be rational, such that the player’s expected material
payoff could be less than their expected material payoffs at
the PE.
Fig. 7 shows the effect of the variation in the frustration
weights on the achieved expected material payoffs, of the
soldier and the attacker, at PE and BU. In this regard, Fig. 7
shows that, as the weight ωa increases, the attacker’s expected
material payoff decreases, as the attacker becomes less apt to
launching any attack. Fig. 7 also shows that, as the weight
ωs increases, the soldier’s expected material payoff increased
by up to 15.11% as compared to the expected material payoff
the soldier achieves in the conventional dynamic game (which
corresponds to the PE expected material payoff of the soldier
at ωs = 0). This stems from the results shown in Fig. 4 that at
higher frustration weights, the attacker becomes less prone to
launching attacks, which leads to an increase in the soldier’s
expected material payoff when the soldier’s beliefs are error-
free. Fig. 7 also shows that potentially inaccurate beliefs,
which occur after 10 iterations in the Bayesian updating
algorithm, yield up to 9.12% loss on the soldier’s and the
attacker’s expected material payoffs.
Fig. 8 highlights the variation in the soldier’s and attacker’s
expected material payoffs at the equilibria as the weight,
θ1, that the attacker assigns as part of its utility function to
maximizing the soldier’s communication delay varies. Fig. 7
shows that, as the weight θ1 increases, the soldier’s expected
material payoff at the NE, PE and BU increases. Here, the
BU solution is generated by running 10 iterations of the
proposed Bayesian updating algorithm. In this respect, Fig.
7 shows that, as the weight θ1 increases from 0.1 to 0.9, the
soldier’s expected material payoffs at NE and PE increase up
to 37.56% and 39.05%, respectively. This stems from the fact
that the attacker’s increased intention to maximize the soldier’s
communication delay causes an increased likelihood (at the
equilibrium) that the attacker compromises the best IoBT
device along the path. This increased likelihood of attacking
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Fig. 9. The soldier’s expected material payoff as its tolerable transmission
delay varies.
the IoBT device with the best channel leads to a decrease in
the likelihood of attacking the remaining IoBT devices. With
the error-free beliefs on the attacker, the soldier becomes more
apt to connecting to the second best device along the path. As
such, the soldier’s expected material payoff still increases with
the increased weight θ1. Meanwhile, at 10 iterations of the
Bayesian updating algorithm, the resulting beliefs of each of
the players would not have totally converged. Hence, at this
point, the beliefs of each of the players are not completely
error-free. This causes the chosen rational strategies not to
completely align with the equilibrium strategies leading to a
decrease of up to 9.23% in the resulting expected material
payoff of the soldier, as compared to its PE expected material
payoff. Hence, similarly to Fig. 7, this result also highlights the
effect that non-error-free beliefs have on the chosen strategies
as well as on the outcome of the game.
Fig. 9 shows how the soldier and attacker’s expected mate-
rial payoffs at an equilibrium vary as the soldier’s tolerable
communication delay ∆ increases. In this respect, Fig. 9
shows that the soldier’s expected material payoff at the NE,
PE and BU increases with an increase in ∆. Fig. 9 also
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Fig. 10. Frustration of the soldier and the attacker at the different steps in
the battlefield.
shows that, as ∆ increases, the soldier’s expected material
payoff at NE and PE increases up to 35.79% and 38.11%,
respectively, while the soldier’s expected material payoff at
the BU increases up to 36.88%. This is due to the fact that, as
∆ increases from 65 ms to 129 ms, the difference between the
normalized communication delay (i.e., τ
∆
) of the best channel
and other channels decreases. Hence, the soldier becomes less
likely, at the equilibrium, to connect to the IoBT device that
has the best channel condition. As the probability that the
attacker compromises the suboptimal IoBT devices decrease,
the likelihood that the soldier evades the attacker’s jamming
attacker increases. Fig. 9 also shows that, when the soldier
and attacker choose optimal strategies based on inaccurate
beliefs (e.g., after only 10 iterations of Bayesian updating),
the soldier’s expected material payoff will decrease by up to
8.70%, which is aligned with the results of Fig. 7 and Fig. 7.
Fig. 10 shows the soldier’s and attacker’s frustration as the
soldier progresses from one step to the other in the battlefield.
At the used simulation parameters, at the third step of this
mission, the attacker attacks the IoBT network, while the
soldier does not connect yet to the network. After observing
previous sequence of actions in the battlefield, the soldier will
connect to the IoBT network at the fourth step. Fig. 10 also
shows that, as the soldier successfully connects to the IoBT
network, without being jammed, the frustration level of the
soldier stays at 0. On the other hand, the frustration level of
the attacker increases at step 3 since it has attacked a device to
which the soldier has not communicated. Fig. 10 shows that
the frustration level of the attacker increases at step 3, and
remains constant until the end of this mission.
Fig. 11 shows the variation of the soldier’s and attacker’s
frustration levels at different iterations of the Bayesian up-
dating algorithm. In this regard, Fig. 11 shows that, as time
elapses, the players’ frustration under each of their chosen
strategies decreases, as the players’ beliefs converge. This, as
a result, highlights the effect of having inaccurate beliefs , not
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Fig. 11. Frustration of the soldier and the attacker resulting from BU, as time
elapses.
only on the expected material payoffs of each player, but also
on their resulting frustration levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered an anti-jamming problem
in an IoBT network in which an adversary attempts to interdict
the connection between a soldier and IoBT devices using
jamming. We have formulated this problem as a dynamic
psychological game. Due to the reliance of the players’ actions
on their beliefs, we have used the Bayesian updating to solve
this game. The psychological game enables the soldier to
determine its actions based on its estimation on the attacker’s
behavior and belief. Simulation results have shown that, by
explicitly intending to frustrate its opponent, the soldier’s
and attacker’s strategies will deviate from their strategies
at a conventional, non-psychological NE. Simulation results
have also shown that, using the proposed Bayesian updating
algorithm, the soldier and the attacker update their beliefs
toward their opponent and can reach ǫ-like psychological self-
confirming equilibrium (PSCE) strategies for our proposed
psychological game
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